

Post-Quantum Cryptography

Andreas Hülsing


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Quantum kills the Internet




Background: Cryptography

Secret key encryption (SKE)



Message authentication (MAC)



How to build secret key crypto?

- Random function sufficient (we need one-wayness)
- Attacks \approx unstructured search

• How

Spoiler:
Killed by quantum? Not that we know.
(but weakened)*


Engineering*




* Disclaimer: Massive simplification

How does Bob
learn shared key k ?

Public key encryption (PKE)



Digital Signature (DSig)



Applications


- Code signing (DSIG)
 - Software updates
 - Software distribution
 - Mobile code




- Communication security (DSIG, PKE / KEX /KEM)
 - TLS, SSH, IPSec, ...
 - eCommerce, online banking, eGovernment, ...
 - Private online communication



Communication security (simplified)



How to build PKC



The Quantum Threat

Shor's algorithm (1994)

- Quantum computers can do FFT very efficiently
- Can be used to find period of a function
- This can be exploited to factor efficiently (RSA)
- Shor also shows how to solve discrete log efficiently (DSA, DH, ECDSA, ECDH)




Grover's algorithm (1996)


- Quantum computers can search N entry DB in $\Theta(\sqrt{N})$
- Application to symmetric crypto
- Nice: Grover is provably optimal (For random function)
- Double security parameter.



How to build PKC



Communication security (simplified)



Why care today

- **EU** launched a one billion Euro project on quantum technologies
- Similar range is spent in **China**
- **US** administration passed a bill on spending \$1.275 billion US dollar on quantum computing research
- **Google, IBM, Microsoft, Alibaba,** and others run their own research programs.

Bloomberg



Technology

Forget the Trade War. China Wants to Win Computing Arms Race

By [Susan Decker](#) and [Christopher Yasejko](#)
9. April 2018, 01:00 MESZ Updated on 9. April 2018, 16:50 MESZ

- ▶ Next wave could transform everything from medicine to crops
- ▶ China is racing with U.S. companies for the quantum tech lead

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IBM	117.19 USD	▼ -1.38 -1.16%
INTEL CORP	46.54 USD	▼ -0.49 -1.04%

As the U.S. and China threaten to impose tariffs on goods from aluminum to wine, the two nations are waging a separate economic battle that could determine who owns the next wave of computing.

Chinese universities and U.S. technology companies, such as International Business Machines Corp. and Microsoft Corp., are racing to develop quantum computers, a type of processing that's forecast to be so powerful it can transform how drug-makers, agriculture companies and auto manufacturers discover compounds and materials.

Quantum computing uses the movement of subatomic particles to process data in amounts that modern computers can't handle. Mostly theoretical now, the technology is expected to be able to perform calculations that


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It's a question of risk
assessment

Real world cryptography development



Who would store all encrypted data traffic?
That must be expensive!




Long-lived systems

- Development time easily 10+ years
- Lifetime easily 10+ years
- At least make sure you got a secure update channel!



What about QKD?

Recall: Communication security (simplified)



The problem solved by QKD

Given

- a shared classical secret.

- a physical channel supporting QKD

- a computational channel


It is possible to

- generate a longer shared classical secret.

“Key growing”
(≠ “Key establishment”)

Solution to the problem
caused by Shor?
Post-quantum cryptography


How to build PKC




Early post-quantum crypto

„Cryptography based on problems that are conjectured to be hard even for quantum computers.“

Lattice-based: SVP / CVP



Code-based: SD



Hash-based: CR / SPR / ...




FIG 1
AN AUTHENTICATION TREE WITH $n = 8$.

PAGE 41B

Multivariate: MQ



$$y_1 = x_1^2 + x_1x_2 + x_1x_4 + x_3$$

$$y_2 = x_3^2 + x_2x_3 + x_2x_4 + x_1 + 1$$

$$y_3 = \dots$$

Modern post-quantum crypto

„Users using cryptography on conventional computers facing quantum adversaries“



Adds questions like

- How to argue security?
- Are our security models sound?
- What is the complexity of actual quantum attacks?

NIST Competition

The screenshot shows the NIST website header with the logo and text: "NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology Information Technology Laboratory". A search bar is located on the right. Below the header, there are links for "CONTACT" and "SITE MAP". The main banner reads "Computer Security Division" and "Computer Security Resource Center". A navigation menu includes "CSRC Home", "About", "Projects / Research", "Publications", and "News & Events". The main content area has a breadcrumb trail: "CSRC HOME > GROUPS > CT > POST-QUANTUM CRYPTOGRAPHY PROJECT". The title is "POST-QUANTUM CRYPTO PROJECT". A news item is dated "December 15, 2016" and states that NIST is accepting submissions for quantum-resistant public-key cryptographic algorithms, with a deadline of "November 30, 2017". A sidebar on the left lists "Post-Quantum Cryptography Project" with sub-links for "Documents", "Workshops / Timeline", "Federal Register Notices", "Email Listserve", and "POC Project Contact".

“We see our role as managing a process of achieving community consensus in a transparent and timely manner” NIST’s Dustin Moody 2018

Status of the competition

- Nov 2017: 82 submissions collected
- Dec 2017: 69 “complete & proper” proposals published
 - -> Starts round 1 (of 2 or 3 rounds)
- Jan 2019: 26 proposals selected for 2nd round.
 - 17 KEM, 9 Signature
- 2022 – 2024 Draft standards exist

General conflict



Security



Performance

Open questions

Proofs are complicated

Possible issues with “proofs”

“Security proof” = proof that breaking scheme is as hard as solving hard math problem

- Some proofs are in the wrong models
- Some proofs are massively loose
- Some proofs are just wrong

In PQC we have to deal with new math, new models of computation & security!

Way out?

- Reviewing is hard, time-consuming, and not rewarding
- Possible solution: Computer-verified proofs

Protocol integration

Plug'n'play?

- Today's protocols are built around DH
- NIST selects KEM and DSig
- Performance gap between SKC and PKC widens
- Efficient schemes are less mature than today's crypto

- Requires new protocol design

Conclusion

- When large-scale QC are built, we need new PKC
- It remains a question of risk assessment
- We are making progress to standardize PQC but we still need time
 - (For applications with long-term secrecy requirements you can move now at the price of higher costs)

Resources

- PQ Summer School:
<http://www.pqcschool.org/>
- NIST PQC Standardization Project:
<https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Post-Quantum-Cryptography>




PQCrypto

11/21/2019

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ICT-645622**

Andreas Hülsing <https://huelsing.net>



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Thank you!

Questions?

